About
This is Sarah Neighbor's blog. She lives with Shannon Murphy. They are a couple of wild and crazy girls.Following
I love it when business activities (homework) cross leisure activities to meet in a beautiful equilibrium of Buddy Holly.
I was actually assigned to listen to one of my favorite musicians. Go college!
Shannon and I are being Wayne and Garth from Wayne’s World for Halloween. We couldn’t find a hat for sale anywhere, so I took it upon myself to make one— I also wanted to prove to Shannon that I could do it. Here are before and after photos.
We’re not worthy!
If I was a billionaire, I’d do social experiments like this:
Hold a “contest” in which people send in a request for either $20 or $100. If less than 20% of the requests are for $100, everyone gets the amount they requested. If 20% or more of the requests are for $100, everyone gets nothing.
I’d also exactly recreate the movie Rat Race (original stars), but make it a reality tv show.
In a successful attempt to put-off studying for my game theory midterm, I came across this wikipedia page about the 101 California Street shooting in 1993.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/101_California_Street_shootings
July 1, 1993 is also the day my family went to Great America. I wouldn’t necessarily remember this date (I was 4 and a half) but it made quite an impression— my dad worked at Pettit and Martin, and missed work that day. Top Gun saved his life. I’ll always love Great America :)
It’s amazing how much of my time is spent thinking about this guy.
For example:
Consider a country with n citizens, and let vi be the value that citizen i attaches to protesting. Enumerate the citizens so that citizen 1 attaches more value to protesting that citizen 2, who attaches more value than citizen 3, and so forth: v1>v2…>vn(=0), where citizen n attaches no value to protesting. Assume that the cost of protesting is the same for all citizens and is c/m where c>0 and m is the number of protestors. Then the payoff to citizen i from protesting is vi-(c/m), while the payoff from not protesting is 0. Assume that v1-c<0. Find all Nash equilibria.
Another touching moment between roommates.
Wishing my dad a happy birthday today :)
